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jueves, 29 de noviembre de 2012

¿Qué implica al nuevo estatus de Palestina como "Estado Observador" en la ONU?

El 29 de noviembre de 1947, la resolución 181 de la Asamblea General acordaba partir el territorio de Palestina en dos estados, uno judío y otro árabe, aunado a un régimen de administración internacional. Hoy y después de 65 años, el mismo día 29 de noviembre, se ha aprobado la resolución que reconoce a Palestina como un Estado no miembro de Naciones Unidas donde 138 naciones votaron a favor mientras 9 lo hicieron en contra junto con 41 abstenciones. México votó a favor, y se suma a un acontecimiento histórico que reúne la buena voluntad de la gran mayoría de las naciones pertenecientes a la comunidad internacional.

De acuerdo con Naxalli Calderón, gran conocedora del tema palestino, "se trata de un triunfo político para Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) quien había perdido un considerable apoyo interno y social dada la condición económica de Cisjordania ante la administración de la Autoridad Nacional Palestina".  Lejos del simbolismo que representa este hecho, y de la posibilidad de que los palestinos puedan acudir a instancias como la Corte Penal Internacional para juzgar casos de crímenes de guerra, el reconocimiento de Palestina como Estado observador en la ONU es sin duda un triunfo político para al Fatah que permite comenzar a ver un panorama óptimo donde relanzar la reconciliación nacional con Hamas que, por cierto, habiendo salido reforzada socialmente tras la pasada crisis en Gaza, ha  apoyado la posición política de Abbas en la ONU con miras a una reconciliación política que sin duda será impulsada por un Egipto hambriento de protagonismo regional.

Aunado a lo anterior, Calderón también señala que debemos tener en mente la posición de la comunidad internacional, principalmente la posición europea, ante este hecho histórico: "para Europa, esto también es una oportunidad vital dados los votos a favor de países como España y la abstención histórica de Alemania que legitiman la posición palestina ante la búsqueda de la paz". Basta escuchar el discurso del representante alemán quien abogó por un futuro acuerdo de paz entre ambos estados, lanzando señales de un avance político muy significativo de su país que históricamente se había negado a votar cualquier solución que afectará sus intereses con Israel. Esta nueva posición alemana es más coherente con los proyectos mediterráneos de desarrollo de la Unión Europea que, a pesar de ir a la Asamblea General sin una posición común como bloque regional, ha coadyuvado a impulsar un cambio de tono en la escena multilateral.

Por otra parte, es de notar también que hoy se exhumó la tumba de Abu Omar (Yasser Arafat) para investigar la sospecha de envenenamiento por polonio-210, con lo que la temperatura política en Palestina ha subido de tono al ver que la mayoría de los países de la comunidad internacional tendrá que lidiar con este asunto viendo a Israel y a Palestina ya como Estados ante el derecho internacional con las puertas de la Corte Penal Internacional abiertas.

Lo anterior se relaciona con una noticia que cae con todo su peso político en la región: Ehud Barak, el arquitecto del complejo militar israelí, se retira de la política oficialmente a sus 70 años. Él fue el hombre que desconocía a todo interlocutor palestino (ya que decía que no existía) y el principal promotor de la aniquilación palestina en las últimas tres décadas. Lo anterior no quiere decir que Israel dará la bienvenida al nuevo Estado Palestino pues, por el contrario, se negará a reconocerlo y promoverá una nueva serie de operaciones políticas e incluso militares que coadyuven a fomentar la división entre Fatah y Hamas, división que el pueblo palestino anhela terminar de una vez por todas. Ejemplo de lo anterior será la construcción de nuevos asentamientos en Cisjordania que sin duda serán todo un reto para la construcción de la paz después de lo acontecido en la ONU. 

Veamos qué pasa en los próximos meses y esperemos las reacciones de los actores políticos palestinos. Mientras tanto, la reacción del pueblo no se ha dejado esperar en las calles de Ramala, Gaza y Jerusalén donde ya se festeja este acontecimiento histórico que puede ser visto, aunque para muchos no lo sea, como el primer cambio significativo "en el terreno", un cambio de muchos otros que pueden venir.


martes, 27 de noviembre de 2012

Represión en nombre de la revolución: Egipto y el decreto del "Faraón Morsi"

Nuevamente decenas de miles de personas han regresado a las calles del Cairo para concentrarse en la Plaza Tahrir. Se trata de la construcción de una misma arquitectura social, de las mismas manifestaciones visuales y verbales, de las mismas acampadas y del mismo objetivo que contra Mubarak: "ash-shab yurid isqad an-nidam".

La diferencia, a parte de que se repudian las transmisiones de Al Yazeera por considerarla como cómplice de lo anunciado por las autoridades, es que ahora el objetivo de estas demandas se encuentra contra la persona del nuevo presidente Muhammad Morsi, a quien muchos ya le apodan "Mubarak". La razón, como muchos medios lo han publicado,  es simple y sencillamente que el presidente, para otros ahora casi Faraón, se ha puesto por encima de la ley al atribuirse poderes que impiden a cualquier institución egipcia anular sus decisiones, al tiempo que ha blindado la Asamblea Constituyente dominada por los Hermanos Musulmanes para legislar sin presiones y con viento a favor.




Dicha decisión no solo ha sacado de nuevo a las calles a opositores del presidente (que por cierto se tachan de "insurrectos del viejo régimen") sino también a los propios hermanos musulmanes que, a diferencia de su papel con nubes de opacidad durante las revueltas contra Mubarak, ahora se han dado citas en las calles del centro y norte del país para defender sus privilegios políticos y económicos que habían ganado mediante las urnas.

Y es que de acuerdo con la constitución egipcia, todas las órdenes y decretos de Mursi escaparian de la fiscalización del poder judicial, lo que evita que los jueces puedan disolver la Comisión Constitucional, la Asamblea Constituyente y el Consejo de la Shura y/o apelar cualquier decisión del alto mandatario en todo sector gubernamental desde acciones judiciales hasta de política exterior. Lo anterior ha orillado a los magistrados a ponerse en huelga indefinida, mientras la Corte Criminal del Cairo ha anunciado que pospondrá todos sus trabajos que no se relacionen con la seguridad nacional hasta que se de marcha atrás a lo ahora se conoce como" el decretazo".

Estas políticas por parte del nuevo presidente van en contra de las inspiraciones originales de la "tawra" egipcia que comenzó en enero de 2011. Una política de preferencias y de posiciones por encimas de las leyes pueden llevar a Egipto al fondo del abismo ya que la estructura económica nacional ha quedado muy dañada y frágil a raíz de los años de corrupción, clientelismo y represión del antiguo régimen, por lo que el arreglo de las estructuras macro y micro económicas, laborales, comerciales y de seguridad deberían se la prioridad del nuevo gobierno antes de pensar en blindar el poder que acaba de adquirir por medios democráticos. Esto no hace más que causar la reacción de descontento de los egipcios que han librado toda una revolución para ver una mejora de sus familias y de próximas generaciones en todo ámbito, sobre todo, del económico y social. 

Pero Morsi no está haciendo otra cosa más que usar la represión en nombre de la revolución y de la salvaguarda de la revolución. Poderes absolutos como alargar las detenciones de hasta seis meses, castigar el derecho de reunión y de prensa, así como cuidar el país de saboteadores y agentes externos que puedan perpetrar actos terroristas, son solo algunas de las intenciones y acciones planeadas por el nuevo gobierno. No estamos hablando de Siria ni de Al Assad por si surgiera alguna sospecha, se trata de las reformas revolucionarias del Egipto post Mubarak, del mismo Egipto de los Hermanos Musulmanes.

Paradójicamente, el gobierno de Mursi había pasado algunas pruebas decisivas en política exterior hasta que se presentó la prueba interna. Su actitud de mediador frente al conflicto Israel-Palestina, su distancia con Irán y Siria y el respeto al tratado de paz con Israel habían sido muestras de un gobierno racional y activo en la nueva agenda regional de Oriente Medio. Sin embargo, las nuevas atribuciones internas ponen en jaque al mismo gobierno al subestimar a una población egipcia que ha estado muy atenta, activa y reactiva, al desarrollo de la primavera árabe no solo dentro de su país sino de toda la región abogando por el respeto a los ideales de sus mobilizaciones, sus mártires, sus himnos y su lenguaje contestatario. 




"El decretazo" en cinco frases"
- Todas las leyes y decisiones del presidente son finales, no pueden ser objeto de recurso, anulado o detenidas por los tribunales u otros órganos. Esto se aplica a las decisiones que ha hecho desde que asumió el cargo en junio y todo lo que hace hasta que una nueva Constitución es aprobada y una nueva elección del Parlamento, prevista para la primavera como muy pronto.
- Ningún órgano judicial puede disolver la cámara alta del parlamento o la asamblea de escribir la nueva constitución. Ambos están dominados por la Hermandad y otros islamistas y varios casos que exigen su disolución eran antes los tribunales, que previamente disuelto la cámara baja del parlamento.
- El presidente puede alguna medida o medidas necesarias para evitar los riesgos para “la revolución, la vida de la nación o de la unidad nacional y la seguridad”, o para el funcionamiento de las instituciones estatales.
- Un nuevo órgano judicial de la “protección de la revolución” se ha creado para reabrir las investigaciones, los procesamientos y los juicios de los funcionarios del antiguo régimen, incluyendo derrocado presidente Hosni Mubarak, por la muerte de manifestantes durante la revuelta del año pasado. Otros oficiales de policía acusados ​​de asesinatos, sin embargo, no se volverá a intentar.
- El polémico fiscal general, nombrado por Mubarak visto por muchos como poco exigente en la búsqueda de figuras del antiguo régimen, fue destituido de su cargo


domingo, 18 de noviembre de 2012

Here are the victims of today, where are the Arabs if they are not the same Arabs who were yesterday


The website Palestine from my eyes displays the name of the victims of Israeli Armed Forces that are attacking Gaza since November 15th.

At the beginning of the post, the site claims that Palestinian people are NOT just numbers, and invites us to keep following the names and ages of murdered people who fell victim during the past days of Israeli attacks on Gaza since Wednesday. The number rises, up to now, to 69 and still rising.

When Israelis in the occupied territories now claim that they have to “defend themselves”, they are defending themselves in the sense that any military occupier has to defend itself against the population they are crushing . According to Chomsky “you can't defend yourself when you are military occupying someone else's land. That is not defense. Call it what you like, it's not defense”.

The names of people killed by the Israeli armed forces, according to Palestine from my eyes web site, are:

1- Ahmad Al-Ja’bary, 52 years old.
2-Mohammed Al-hams, 28 years old.

3- Rinan Arafat, 7 years old.
4- Omar Al-Mashharawi, 11 moonths old.
5-Essam Abu-Alma’za, 20 years old.
6-Mohammed Al-qaseer, 20 years old.
7- Heba Al-Mashharawi, six-month pregnant, 19 years old.
8- Mahmoud Abu Sawawin, 65 years old.

9- Habis Hassan Mismih, 29 years old.
10- Wael Haidar Al-Ghalban, 31 years old.
11- Hehsam Mohammed Al-Ghalban, 31 years old.
12- Rani Hammad, 29 years old.
13- Khaled Abi Nasser, 27 year old.
14- Marwan Abu Al-Qumsan, 52 years old.
15- Walid Al-Abalda, 2 years old.
16- Hanin Tafesh, 10 months old.
17- Oday Jammal Nasser, 16 years old.
18- Fares Al-Basyouni, 11 years old.
19- Mohammed Sa’d Allah, 4 years old.
20- Ayman Abu Warda, 22 years old.
21- Tahrir Suliman, 20 years old.
22- Ismael Qandil, 24 years old.
23- younis Kamal Tafesh, 55 years old.
24- Mohammed Talal Suliman, 28 years old.
25- Amjad Mohammed Abu-Jalal, 32 years old.
26- Ziyad Farhan Abu-Jalal, 23 years old.
27- Ayman Mohammed Abu Jalal, 44 years old.
28- Hassan Salem Al-Heemla’, 27 years old.
29- Khaled Khalil Al-Shaer, 24 years old.
30- Ayman Rafeeq sleem, 26 years old.
31- Ahmad Abu Musamih, 32 years old.


At 8:20 am, as a result to an Israeli inhumane attack on Deel Al-Balah, central Gaza, three people were killed. The list of murdered victims goes longer>>>

32- Osama Abdejjawad
33- Ashraf Darwish
34- Ali Al-Mana’ma

At 8:45 am_ 9:00 am, warplanes attacked several places including Rafah, Khan-Younis, and Tal Al-Sultan, southern Gaza, leaving three killed>>

35`- Mukhlis Edwan
36- Mohammed Al-Loulhy, 24 years old.
37- Ahmad Al-Atrush

In a series of attacks on several places on central Gaza at noon, two more people fell victim:

38- Abderrahman Al-Masri
39- Awad Al-Nahhal
40- Ali Hassan Iseed, 25 years old, killed in an attack on his motorbike in Deer Al-Balah, central Gaza, at 8:10 pm, November 17th.

IOF attack another motorbike in Deer Al-Balah at 8:20 pm, leaving two more killed:

41- Mohammed Sabry Al’weedat, 25 years old.
42- Osama Yousif Al-Qadi, 26 years old.

In an attack on central Gaza, to the west of Al-Masdar area, at 9:10 pm, two more people people killed:

43- Ahmad Ben Saeed, 42 years old.
44- Hani Bre’m, 31 years old.

At 9:40 pm, Israel attacked Qdeih family’s house in west Khan-Younis, Southern Gaza and a woman got killed.

45- Samaher Qdeih, 28 years old.
46- Tamer Al-Hamry,  26 years old, died after being seriously injured in an attack on Deer Al-Balah.

On November 18, the fifth day of the Israeli ongoing aggression on Gaza:

Israeli warplanes shelled the house of Abu-Alfoul family in northern Gaza, killing two children and injuring at 13 at least, mostly children and women.

47- Gumana Salamah Abu Sufyan, 1 year old.
48- Tamer Salamah  Abu Sufyan, 3 years old.

An Israeli warplanes fired missiles at a house that belongs to the family of Abu Nuqira in Rafah killing one person:

49- Muhamed Abu Nuqira

An Israeli war plane fired a missile at a house in an agricultural land east of Bureij camp, in the Central Gaza Strip, killing one child and injuring 2 other children:

50- Eyad Abu Khusa, 18 months old.
Two people were killed, one of them a child, when an Israeli missile hit a beachfront refugee camp in Gaza City:

51- Tasneem Zuheir Al-Nahhal, 13 years old.
52- Ahmad Essam Al-Nahhal, 25 years old.

Medics also reported finding the body of woman under the rubble of a house in eastern Gaza City who had been killed in a strike earlier in the morning.

53- Nawal Abdelaal, 52 years old.

At 3:10 pm, November 18, Israel rocked a house belongs to Al-Dalou family in Sheikh-Redwan area, west Gaza, killing at least 10 people, including 4 women and 4 children.

54- Mohammed Jamal Al-Dalou, the father.
55- Ranin Mohammed Jamal Al-Dalou, 5 years old.
56- Jamal Mohammed Jamal Al-Dalou, 7 year old.
57- Yousef Mohammed Jamal Al-Dalou, 10 years old.
58- Ibrahim Mohammed Jamal Al-Dalou, 1 year old.
59- Jamal Al-Dalou, the grandfather.
60-  Sulafa Al Dalou, 46 years old
61- Samah Al-Dalou, 25 years old
62- Tahani Al-Dalou, 50 years old
63- Ameina Matar Al-Mzanner, 83 years old.
64- Abdallah Mohammed Al-Mzanner, 23 years old.

Soon after Al-Dalou massacre, 2 more were killed, including a child, in an attack on a car for water supply in northern Gaza.

65- Suheil Hamada
66-Mo’men HamadaIn an airstrike that targeted Nussairat camp after that another one was murdered and 10 at least got injured
67- Atiyya Mubarak.68- Samy Al-Ghfeir, 22 years old, killed in an attack on Shijaiyya area, west Gaza.
69- Mohammed Bakr Al-Of, 24 years old, killed in an attack on Al-Yarmouk st. in Gaza city.

At 8:00 pm, November 18, the ministry of health in Gaza has reported that Israel has risen the death toll in Gaza to 69, including 20 children, 8 women, and 9 elderly people. Moreover, Over 660 person got injured since Wednesday, including 224 children, 113 women, and 50 elderly people.
Keep following this post. I’m going to keep updating it on everything that is happening as much as I can and as long as I’m breathing!

The attack of the Israeli armed forces against Gaza repeats itself, as did it in 2008, after the Barack Obama´s presidential victory. The objective is to restore its deterrence capability against regional neighbors as well to discredit the political bonanza of Hamas after the formal talks with al-Fatah, the political visit of Emir of Qatar, the maintenance of the alliance with Iran, and the possibility to go with Mahmoud Abbas for the recognition of a Palestinian State in the United Nations next November 29th.

However, as exactly happens in 2008, Israel is getting closer to international disrepute and away from the U.S support in the regional agenda, at least, during the next years of Obama ´s administration.

While Israel imprisons Palestinians, humiliates entire families, economically sabotages entire towns, steal their land and denied access to basic goods, Palestinian people suffer the harassment of Israeli military, who, despite the slaughter of children and women, threatens to widen its military operation to a ground operation in the next hours.

While the regional context has now changed a lot and puts in power some political groups very close to the Palestinian cause, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia, the response to the Israeli military offensive remains in the same; this is, silence, immobility, reaction instead of action, and brings a certain kind of complicity very similar to that experienced in 2008.

For this, the Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi declared that: “Egypt today is different from yesterday, and Arabs today are different from yesterday.” If this is true, we have to ask him again and again the very same question of the last 60 years: ¿where are the Arabs? Where are the Arabs if they are not the same Arabs who were yesterday?




sábado, 10 de noviembre de 2012

Ta'roof iraní y las negociaciones nucleares


Aquellos que hayan experimentado el ta'roof notarán la fascinante y singular manía de tratar al huésped por parte de un iraní. 

Ta'roof  tiene su origen de una palabra árabe que denota "interés por familiarizarse con alguien" y "tratarlo  de la mejor manera", y que se materializa en muchos lugares donde se intercambia un servicio tales como el autobús, el taxi, un almacén o un hotel. 

Intente usted pagar a un iraní por cualquier servicio y ésta persona se negará a recibir su dinero las primeras dos o tres veces para después tomarlo con una sonrisa, al tiempo que le devuelve su cambio junto con una buena frase poética de amabilidad. Intente ceder su asiento a un iraní en un autobús de Teherán y es más probable que usted termine sentado mientras le preguntan cosas sobre el país. Intente pagar la cuenta de un hotel por adelantado y prepárese mejor para descansar y relajarse de su viaje. Intente comprar una baratija en el bazar y antes de pagarla prepárese para recibir la explicación más mínima de cómo funciona la mercancía. Hay cientos de ejemplos más de vivir el ta'roof iraní.

Pero también es verdad que el ta' roof tiene sus dimensiones sociales y políticas que puede prestarse a malos entendimientos para quien no lo conoce fuera del ambiente de los servicios y las cosas del día a día. 


Por ejemplo, muchos  investigadores, reporteros o interesados en Irán han acudido alguna vez en su vida a una embajada del país persa para ahondar en su investigación. Normalmente, suelen ser recibidos por una persona encantadora, amable y sonriente que pide para ellos un té, azúcar y dulces típicos para entablar la conversación y los cuales suelen ser deliciosos al paladar y al ambiente de recibimiento. Durante la entrevista todo es perfecto, la persona los escucha muy atentamente y cualquier petición o solicitud a la embajada es bienvenida con una sonrisa. Prometen muchas cosas y piden regresar en una semana o dos.

Cuando la persona regresa recibe exactamente el mismo trato. Dulces, té, sonrisas y atención, y si bien le va recibe también un tríptico o un CD de información para visitar Irán y/o un regalo con alguna ornamentación persa.

A la persona interesada le resulta extraño regresar una y otra vez a la embajada y recibir el mismo trato pero  sin tener una solución clara de lo que se ha pedido incialmente. En este caso, ta'roof significa "no podemos hacer lo que usted nos pide ahora, pero puede venir a platicar los días que quiera". Se trata de una forma muy sútil de decir "no por el momento", pero que deja abierta la posibilidad de hacerlo en el futuro.

Para las personas que suelen ser muy directas en su trato, para decir "si o "no", el ta'roof puede desorientar y en otras ocasiones llevar a la ofuscación. 


Pero este modo diplomático de los iraníes de relacionarse con las personas debe ser entendido como una forma de diálogo que siempre lleva a buenos términos, al igual que intenta hacer la táctica informal del "cuarto cerrado" muy aplicada en Occidente para destrabar las fuertes tensiones de una negociación. Ante esto, se debe señalar que las técnicas iraníes, como aquellas pertenecientes a un buen país asiático, suelen ser muy lentas y detalladas en su desarrollo. Hay muchas preguntas y jornadas en extremo largas para intentar desgastar al adversario. De hecho, el jefe negociador habla muy poco, y las cosas que se deciden sobre la marcha siempre se pronuncian al final, por lo que cualquiera que enfrente una negociación con un iraní debe llevar en su maleta una gran dosis de paciencia.

En el caso del llamado "dossier nuclear" pasa lo mismo. Cuando Occidente reduce el ta'roof iraní a decir que "Irán solo busca ganar tiempo para construir su bomba" lo que se hace es cerrar la puerta de un diálogo que Irán siempre ha intentado mantener abierta a escala internacional pero cuya proyección es mal interpretada por no existir el mínimo grado de confianza necesario entre las partes. Para Occidente es sumamente difícil intervenir militarmente en Irán tal como lo es para Teherán construir una bomba nuclear. Ambos actores lo pueden hacer pero los riesgos y los gastos de esas acciones pueden ser más grandes que lo que un actor y otro tratan de evitar actualmente.

Si bien Occidente no se acomoda al ta´roof iraní, los iraníes tampoco entienden la razón por la cual no se transmiten públicamente las negociaciones entre uno y otro actor y prefieren mantenerse a "puerta cerrada". Exponer los puntos de vista de ambos actores es algo que la comunidad internacional tiene el derecho de saber para no dejarse guiar por la propaganda de sus prensas locales. La premisa de que el ta'roof iraní en la cuestión nuclear no llegará a ningún acuerdo es falsa en tanto se ha demostrado que el acuerdo alcanzado entre Irán,Turquía y Brasil en mayo de 2010 fue totalmente ignorado por Occidente en una muestra de falta de voluntad.


Varias veces he escuchado decir a algunos investigadores occidentales que el ta´roof iraní es una muestra de arrogancia y de sentimiento de supremacía con respecto al "otro" donde el iraní trata de dejar todo en la ambigüedad para sacarle provecho al tiempo. Pero la arrogancia no es algo que Occidente no desconozca en su interior a la hora de relacionarse con Oriente y de imponer formas y marcos de referencia para relacionarse con ese "otro". Basta señalar que hay más coincidencias culturales, políticas y estratégicas entre Irán y Occidente de las que muchos creen y que la arrogancia ha sido parte de la retórica de ambos actores; así, será solo cuando la eliminación de la arrogancia política florezca que se podrá encontrar el punto de arranque para un mejor entendimiento con los iraníes, tal vez cuando ellos conozcan el ta´roof de Occidente que seguramente está en la voluntad política que otorga el derecho internacional.



viernes, 2 de noviembre de 2012

La celebración iraní del "día contra la arrogancia global"

Mientras los miembros del Ministerio del Exterior y el Ejecutivo iraníes afirman que las negociaciones nucleares no se reiniciarán sino hasta pasadas las elecciones presidenciales en Estados Unidos, el titular de la Organización Militar asimétrica conocida como Basiyi anunció hoy que "Irán podía volver a tener relaciones diplomáticas con Estados Unidos siempre y cuando Washington hiciera una serie de reformas necesarias para mostrar su buena voluntad con Irán". Entre las medidas que Muhammad Reza Naqdi mencionó hoy se encuentran el desmantelamiento de la CIA, el desmembramiento de 50 bases militares estadounidenses alrededor del mundo y el retiro de sus fuerzas navales del Golfo Pérsico.



Estas declaraciones se llevan a cabo en el día que el gobierno iraní ha denominado como "El día nacional contra la arrogancia global",  el cual conmemora la toma de la embajada estadounidense en Teherán tras la revolución de 1979 y la salida del colonialismo económico y cultural del país. Cierto es que Irán es el único país donde se conmemora un día con dicho título y donde se considera "ta3tilaat" (vacaciones) para todo funcionario público a lo largo y ancho del país.

En el día de hoy se celebraron manifestaciones a favor del gobierno y una serie de programas en televisión que dedican a recordar este día como "un triunfo nacional para todos los iraníes". En particular, los debates en noticieros y medios impresos de comunicación no cesaron de recordar lo que los Pasdaran llaman "los avances de la nación", a la par de criticar seriamente las políticas pasadas de acercamiento con Estados Unidos por parte de algunos políticos como Jatami, a quien personajes como el director del influyente diario Kayhan, Hossein Shariatmadari, calificaron de "traidor a la patria" junto con otros reformistas cercanos a lo que se conoce como el movimiento verde.



Este tipo de conmemoraciones han sido frecuentemente usadas por el gobierno para ir borrando la memoria de otras fechas importantes entre la juventud iraní tales como el "día del estudiante" o ruz-e daneshyu (próximo 6 de diciembre), donde cada día 16 azaar se dan cita centenas de movilizaciones universitarias en las principales ciudades del país, y que últimamente han ido ligadas al rechazo de los resultados de las elecciones presidenciales de 2009, la crisis económica y la presencia de personal basiyi en las universidades públicas e institutos privados del país.

Generalmente, el gobierno trata de sacar partida de estas celebraciones "celebrándolas a su manera" y acaparando los medios de comunicación para difundir mensajes como el que hoy se ha visto por parte del director del diario Keyhan o el representante de las fuerzas militares basiyi, todo con el fin de mostrar una fotografía más convincente de la cohesión iraní ante el impacto económico de las sanciones entre la clase media y baja.

Basta decir que la toma de la embajada solía ser un evento organizado por organizaciones que hicieron posible la revolución armada y que, tras la llamada revolución cultural, dicho evento fue "institucionalizado" por el gobierno al igual que otros festejos ajenos a la ideología islámica revolucionaria iraní tales como el "día del trabajo" (may day) y el propio día del estudiante.



jueves, 1 de noviembre de 2012

Khalid Charibi: The Reform of the Islamic Calendar - Part 2


Here is the continuation of the article by Khalid Chraibi (it was originally published atTabsir.net. It is being republished here with the permission of the author). Here he summarizes some individual and institutional positions on the use of astronomical calculations for the Islamic calendar. See Part 1 of the article here.


The Reform of the Islamic Calendar: Part 2

Khalid Chraibi


The legal opinion of Qadi Shakir
Egyptian qadi Ahmad Muhammad Shakir (who was to become President of the Egyptian Supreme Court of the Shariah at the end of his career, and who remains to this day an author of reference in the field of hadith) (9), wrote a lengthy legal opinion in 1939 on the subject of the Islamic calendar, entitled : “The beginning of Arab months… is it legal to determine it using astronomical calculations?”. (2) According to him, the Messenger took into account the fact that the Muslim community of his time was “illiterate, not knowing how to write nor how to count”. So, he recommended to its members to observe the new moon to carry out their religious duties at the time of fasting and hajj. But the community evolved considerably over time, and some of its members even became experts in astronomy.

According to the principle of Muslim law which states that “a rule is no longer applicable, when the factor which justified its existence has disappeared”, the Messenger’s recommendation didn’t apply anymore to the Muslims, after they had learned to read and count and had ceased being illiterate. Therefore, according to Shakir, contemporary ulama’ commit an error of interpretation when they give to the Messenger’s hadith the same interpretation that applied at the time of Revelation, as if the hadith prescribed immutable rules. But, it has stopped being applicable to the Muslim community long ago, based on the principles of the shari’ah themselves. 

Furthermore, Shakir refers to the principle of Muslim law according to which “what is relative cannot refute what is absolute, nor can it be preferred to it, according to the consensus of the ulamas.” The observation of the new moon with the naked eye is relative, and can be the subject of error, whereas the knowledge of the beginning of lunar months, based on astronomical calculations, is absolute, and belongs to the domain of certainty.

Shakir reaches the conclusion that there is nothing in the shari’ah which opposes the use of calculations to determine the beginning of all lunar months, in all circumstances, and not only in special situations, as had been recommended by some ulama’. For him, there can exist only one lunar month applicable in all countries of the world, based on astronomical calculations. The use of the same pre-calculated calendar in all Muslim countries will give them an opportunity to celebrate all major Islamic events on the same day, throughout the world, thereby increasing their feeling of solidarity and unity.

In the 73 years since their publication, Shakir’s conclusions have not been refuted by any Muslim jurist. As a man of law, and as an expert on hadith, he continues to be highly considered by his peers, long after his death. (9) Thus, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the well-known theologian and jurist, has lavishly praised Shakir in a 2004 article entitled “Astronomical calculations and determination of the beginning of months” in which he expressed his full support to qadi Shakir’s conclusions. (3)

Paradoxes
In the process of analyzing this topic, one’s attention is unavoidably drawn to the many paradoxes which exist in the situation, and which have to be confronted if one is to make some progress in dealing with the issues. Thus:

a) The Islamic calendar based on the observation of the new moon is only used in contemporary Muslim societies to determine the dates associated with religious celebrations. To meet all their other needs, Muslims around the world have used, for many centuries, the Gregorian calendar, based on astronomical calculations, without the slightest apprehension that they might thereby be violating religious prescriptions.

Why would it be licit for Muslims (including ulama’) to use the Gregorian calendar based on astronomical calculations to meet all their needs, while the use of the Islamic calendar, based on the same calculations, would be illicit?

b) The same situation can be observed at the level of the Muslim States. For example, Saudi Arabia sees no problem in using the Umm al Qura calendar, based on calculations, for the management of all the administrative and budgetary affairs of the country, while insisting that it would be illicit to use it for the determination of the dates of religious celebrations. On which rules of Shari’ah does this paradoxical proposition base itself? 

c) The use by Saudi Arabia of the calendar based on calculations to manage its administrative affairs implies, beyond any doubt, that the lunar calendar based on the monthly observation of the new moon is unfit for such use. So, one must ask oneself: When the Messenger Muhammad referred to the observation of the new moon to determine the beginning of a new lunar month, was it his intention to disconnect the Arab calendar from its astronomical moorings, making it unfit for any practical use? Or did he merely give, at the time of Revelation, an appropriate response to the question put to him, based on the current practices of the Arabs at that time ? In the latter case, shouldn’t this response have been reviewed and adapted to the needs of Muslim societies as they progressed in their scientific, cultural and social environment? Isn’t it time to proceed with this review and adaptation now?

d) Why are the prayer times determined in a lawful shari’ah manner on the basis of astronomical calculations, and yet it is stated that the beginnings of Islamic months cannot be dealt with using the same tools and methods?

Based on all the above considerations, numerous Muslim thinkers and community organizations consider that it is perfectly licit for Muslims to use a calendar based on calculations, in substitution to the calendar based on the monthly observation of the new moon, to determine the beginning of all months. But there remain major differences between them concerning the specifics of the Muslim calendar which could be used as a “global Islamic calendar”, as is clear form the major proposals which were made in this domain in recent years. 

The decision of the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA)
The Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA) was regularly confronted with the responsibility of telling its Muslim American audience when to start fasting, when to celebrate eid al-fitr, etc. After several years of study of the legal issues involved, it reached a decision, which it announced in August 2006, to use henceforth a pre-calculated Islamic calendar, taking into consideration the sightability of the new moon anywhere on Earth. (4) The decision of the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA) combines the theological requirements of the ulama’ with the state of the art in the field of new moon observation. First, it retains the well-known principle of unicity of horizons (matali’) which states that it is sufficient to observe the new moon anywhere on Earth, in order to declare the beginning of a new lunar month, applicable in all areas in which the information is received. (10) Second, it uses the International date line (IDL) or Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) as its conventional point of reference to conduct its analysis.

Based on the maps of sightability of the new moon in the various regions of Earth, which are now regularly prepared by professional astronomers (11), the FCNA reached the conclusion that when the conjunction took place before 12:00 noon (GMT), there was enough time left for the new moon to be seen in numerous areas on Earth where sunset took place long before sunset in North America. Since the criteria of sightability of the new moon were met in these areas, the new moon would be observed (or could have been observed if weather conditions had been adequate) long before sunset in North America.

Therefore, the requirements of sightability of the new moon as set by the shari’ah would be respected, and the new lunar month could begin in North America on sunset of the same day. On the other hand, if the conjunction took place after 12:00 noon GMT, the month would begin in North America on sunset of the following day.

The FCNA decision aroused much interest in many Muslim countries, because it elegantly met the requirements of the traditional interpretation of the shari’ah, while making use of the state-of-the art know-how in the field of astronomy to respond to the needs of the modern age. It was thought that this solution could be applicable in other Muslim countries, and could give them a chance to adopt the same pre-calculated Islamic calendar (prepared on an annual basis, long in advance), in order to fulfill all the religious duties as well as to manage all other tasks. 

An international conference was thus held in Morocco, in November 2006, to study the issues involved, with the participation of astronomers from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Iran, Guinea, Libya, Morocco, and the USA. The overwhelming majority of the participants, including Saudi, Egypt, and Iran astronomers agreed that the calendar adopted by Fiqh Council of North America could be used as a Global Islamic Calendar. (12)

A “global Islamic calendar” based on calculations, set to the coordinates of Makkah
But FCNA changed its position in 2007 to align itself on a new decision by the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), which used the same parameters as those of the Umm al Qura calendar (7) to determine the beginning of Islamic months. These parameters are as follows : the “conjunction” must take place “before sunset at the coordinates of Makkah” and “moonset must take place after sunset” at the same coordinates. FCNA and ECFR justified the adoption of the new parameters by their desire to help develop a consensus within the Muslim community throughout the world on issues of common interest, among which that of the calendar.

From a methodological point of view, the substitution of the parameters of Umm al Qura calendar to those initially set by FCNA in its August 2006 decision has the following consequences:

• The requirement that the “conjunction” take place “before sunset at the coordinates of Makkah” instead of 12:00 noon GMT, as previously specified by FCNA, adds 3 hours to the time period during which the conjunction will be taken into account. This improves the chances that the first day of the new month will immediately follow the day on which the conjunction takes place.

• But, the requirement that “moonset take place after sunset” at the Makkah coordinates sets an unduly restrictive condition, which didn’t exist in FCNA parameters of 2006. It implies that the new moon will be potentially sightable at Makkah on the evening of the day of conjunction, whereas the FCNA based its reasoning on the fact that the new moon would be potentially sightable “somewhere on Earth”. 
According to FCNA, the data of the calendar thus obtained differs only marginally from the data developed using its methodology of August 2006. Concretely, the decisions of FCNA and ECFR had the following results:

• The principle of use of a calendar based on calculations was officially sponsored by religious leaders who are well-known and respected within the Muslim community (2) (3) (13)

• This principle was officially adopted by Islamic organizations whose legitimacy and credibility are unquestionable;

• The Muslim communities in Europe and America were willing to use this calendar to determine the beginning of all months, including those associated with religious events.

1st Ramadan 1433: a case study
Five years after the adoption by the FCNA and ECFR of their important decisions, it is possible to draw the point of the situation, based on the announcements made by the major Muslim States and organizations concerned, on the occasion of the 1st of Ramadan 1433 (July 2012). It shows that there remains major differences between them concerning the properties and technical specifications that a “global Islamic calendar” should have.

Thus, in application of its stated policy, the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA) announced early in July 2012, well in advance of the event, that “the first day of Ramadan 1433 will be Friday, July 20, 2012 and Eid al-Fitr on Sunday, August 19, 2012″. The FCNA explained that:

a) it recognized astronomical calculation as an acceptable shar’ia method for determining the beginning of lunar months including the months of Ramadan and Shawwal;
b) it used Makkah al-Mukarrama as a conventional point for the calculations; and
c) it took the position that the conjunction must take place before sunset in Makkah and moon must set after sunset in Makkah. “On the basis of this method the dates of Ramadan and Eidul Fitr for the year 1433 AH are established as follows: 1st of Ramadan will be on Friday, July 20, 2012 ; and 1st of Shawwal will be on Sunday, August 19, 2012.” (14)

But, the Dublin-based European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) seemed to have changed position, at least momentarily, compared to its 2007 decision. It also announced, well in advance, that the 1st of Ramadan 1433 would be on Friday, July 20, 2012, but explained that this finding was “based on calculation criteria that there must be the possibility of crescent sighting by naked eye or telescope on any place on Earth. To accept the possibility of crescent sighting in any place on Earth the following conditions must exist :
a) The moon must set after sunset in the place where sighting is possible
b) The elevation of the crescent must be at least 5 degrees
c) The elongation distance between the sun and moon must be at least 8 degrees.” (15)

In contrast, Saudi Arabia continued to claim its officially stated, but hard to verify, policy of relying exclusively on sighting to determine the dates of religious observances. Thus, on the evening of Thursday, July 19, 2012 the Saudi authorities announced that the new moon had been observed and that the fast of Ramadan would start on Friday, July 20. The Saudi statement contradicted astronomers’ announcement in moonsighting websites worldwide that it would be impossible to observe the new moon in the Middle East region on the evening of Thursday, July 19. (15) However, based on the Saudi announcement, some 69 countries and Muslim communities worldwide began the fast of Ramadan on Friday, July 20. This represented a historical record in the number of Muslim countries which began fasting on the same date. (15)

For their part, the major Muslim associations of France also announced that the 1st of Ramadan 1433 would be on Friday, July 20, 2012 using a calendar based on astronomical calculations, taking into account the criteria of the possibility of crescent sighting in any place on Earth. (16) 

Turkish Muslims in Asia Minor and several Muslim communities in Eastern Europe and elsewhere also began their fast of Ramadan 1433 on Friday, July 20, 2012, basing themselves on the Islamic calendar of Turkey, which is calculated several years in advance (currently up to 1437 AH/2015 CE) by the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi). (17) Since 1 Muharrem 1400 AH (21 November 1979) the computed Turkish lunar calendar is based on the following rule: “The lunar month is assumed to begin on the evening when, within some region of the terrestrial globe, the computed centre of the lunar crescent at local sunset is more than 5° above the local horizon and (geocentrically) more than 8° from the Sun.” (18) 

One can draw the following conclusions from the 1st Ramadan 1433 illustration:
a) the use of a Muslim lunar calendar based on calculations is steadily gaining grounds, particularly within the Muslim communities of North America and Western Europe. But there are still important differences as to which new lunar calendar to use, as witnessed by the different methodologies used by FCNA, ECFR, the Muslim associations of France and Turkish Muslims;
b) the number of States claiming to follow the leadership of Saudi Arabia in the matter of the date of religious observances is growing at a considerable rate;
c) Saudi Arabia’s strategy and objectives in the matter of determination of the lunar months associated with religious observances continue to be puzzling for the observer. The Saudi authorities regularly announce the observation of a new moon on dates when professional astronomers state that such sighting was impossible. They use the Umm al Qura calendar (which is based on astronomical calculations) for civil and administrative purposes, but quite regularly advance or postpone the weekday on which falls the 1st of the month associated with religious observances, for unexplained reasons. (7)

These changes decrease the credibility and value of the Umm al Qura calendar as an astronomical calendar that the Muslim community could use, worldwide, leading Muslim communities in North America and Europe to draw their own Muslim astronomical calendar.

The ritual confrontation between tradition and modernity
On the basis of what has been said, it is clear that the Muslim calendar based on the monthly observation of the new moon with the naked eye cannot perform the functions expected of a calendar. It is of no use to manage long-term activities, to anticipate, plan and organize in advance everything that must be done. These weaknesses stand out even more clearly when each State and Muslim community around the world conducts its own individual monthly observation of the new moon, resulting in a range of calendars which present conflicting data for the same day from one country to another. 
But, a lunar calendar based on calculations can meet all the needs of Muslims in the world, just as well as the Gregorian calendar they currently use. The only problem concerns the determination of the parameters that would be acceptable to all potential users of the calendar, to turn it into a “global Islamic calendar”. The FCNA and the ECFR presented, in this respect, two basic versions of such a calendar, both equally valid. They deserve to be studied with the greatest care.

Following in the steps of Qadi Shakir, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and the leaders of the FCNA and the ECFR, a new generation of Muslim thinkers see no religious barrier to the adoption of such a calendar. At present, they represent only a minority of people, when compared to the entire Muslim population of the world, and are mostly located in North America, Europe and some North African countries. But, their views are gaining ground, with the support of some distinguished thinkers, political and social leaders, jurists and theologians who are influential in the Muslim world. 

Will this Muslim minority be able to convert to its thinking the vast majority of those who, today, continue to uphold the practice of the monthly observation of the new moon? Or, will the latter remain faithfully on the side of the fundamentalist movements which, today more than ever, vigorously preach the respect of orthodoxy and tradition in religious matters? In these early years of the 21st century, the calendar based on calculations thus becomes, in its turn, a stake in the ritual, recurrent political confrontation between those who defend tradition and those who wish to promote modernity in Muslim societies. 

Footnotes 
(10) Abi al-Fayd Ahmad al-Ghomari: Tawjih alandhar litaw-hidi almouslimin fi assawmi wal iftar(In order to unify the Muslims when they start and end the fast of Ramadan), 160p, 1960, Dar al bayareq, Beyrouth, 2nd ed. 1999
(13) Zulfikar Ali Shah: ‘The astronomical calculations: a fiqhi discussion’
(14) Fiqh Council of North America: http://fiqhcouncil.org/ Announcements - Ramadan & Eid Mubarak 1433 (2012):
• Ramadan 1433 AH:
• The Astronomical New Moon is on July 19, 2012 (Thursday) at 4:24 Universal Time (7:24 a.m. Makkah time). Sunset at Makkah on July 19 is at 7:05 p.m., while moonset is at 7:11 p.m. Moon is born before sunset in Makkah and moonset is after sunset. Therefore first day of Ramadan is Friday, July 20.
• Eid ul-Fitr 1433 AH:
• The Astronomical New Moon is on August 17, 2012 (Friday) at 15:54 Universal Time (6:54 p.m. Makkah time). On Friday, August 17, sunset at Makkah is 6:49 p.m. and moonset is 6:30 p.m. Moon is born after sunset in Makkah and moon sets before sunset. On Saturday, August 18 , sunset at Makkah is 6:49 p.m. and moonset is at 7:11 p.m. Moon is born 24 hours before sunset, while moonset is after sunset. Therefore, first day of Shawwal, i.e., Eid ul-Fitr is Sunday, August 19.
(15) European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) announcement:http://www.moonsighting.com/1433rmd.html 
(16) Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM): Ramadan moubarak http://oumma.com/13434/ramadan-moubarak and Nidhal Guessoum: Quel sera le premier jour du mois de Ramadan 2012 ? (On which date will Ramadan 2012 begin) ?http://oummatv.tv/13306/sera-premier-jour-mois-de-ramadan
(18) Robert Harry van Gent: The Islamic calendar of Turkeyhttp://www.staff.science.uu.nl/~gent0113/islam/diyanetcalendar.htm 

References: 

Helmer Aslaksen: The Islamic calendar 
Methods used by countries for determining the beginning of Islamic months : http://moonsighting.com/methods.html 
Moonsighting.com: Selected articles on the Islamic calendar
Islamic Crescent’s Observation Project (ICOP): http://www.icoproject.org/ Selected articles on the Islamic calendar in Arabic 
Mohamed Odeh: The actual Saudi dating system 
Karim Meziane et Nidhal Guessoum: La visibilité du croissant lunaire et le ramadan, La Recherche n° 316, janvier 1999, pp. 66-71
Nidhal Guessoum, Mohamed el Atabi and Karim Meziane : Ithbat acchouhour alhilaliya wa mouchkilate attawqiti alislami (Establishing the lunar months and the problem of keeping time in Islam), 152 p., Dar attali’a, Beyrouth, 2nd ed., 1997 
Different proposals for the reform of the Islamic calendar:http://moonsighting.com/calendar.html
A video by Dr.Muzammil Siddiqi on “Fiqh Council of North America about using astronomical calculations to affirm the month of Ramadan”: http://www.islamicity.com/islamitv/?ref=5919 
An Article on Sighting and Calculations by Dr. Muneer Fareed
A video by Dr. Jamal Badawi on “To see or not to see: the Moon Sighting controversy in Islam”: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EzLqHyQ8l9U
A video by Dr. Tahirul Qadri: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qZ8ieVBlE6g