The collective action of Mujahedeen-e
Khalq Organization (MKO): changes, interests and political marketing
By Moses Garduño *
* Moises Garduño is Professor of the Faculty of Political
and Social Sciences of the National Autonomous University of Mexico where he
teaches Middle East Studies and Arabic Language. He is also PhD candidate in Contemporary Arab and
Islamic Studies at the Faculty of Philosophy of Autonomous University of
Madrid.
Abstract
For over three decades MKO has survived and operated against the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran supported by the government of Saddam Hussein (in eighties) and for several personalities of the U.S. and the European Union governments in nowadays under National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). Led by the charismatic Maryam Rajavi, wife of the movement's official leader Massoud Rajavi, MKO promotes the establishment of "The Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran", a project that displays that Islam, democracy and human rights can be implemented in "a future and new Iranian state. However, its story full of political treachery, terrorist acts and harassment against its own members, casts doubt on the authenticity of its political project which, with the unfavorable international environment faced since the departure of the U.S. troops from Iraq in 2009, cast doubt its legitimacy and future as a political organization.
Keywords: MKO, National Council of Resistance, Massoud Rajavi, Maryam Rajavi.
Iran: From Revolutionaries to enemies of the
revolution
It was under one of the largest political organizations of Iran in the sixties, the Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran (Iran Freedom Movement) led by Mehdi Bazargan and Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleqani[1], where emerged the seed of Mujahedin e Khalq Organization or "Fighters of the People of Iran (MKO)[2] and others guerrilla organizations formed by middle class people interested in the political environment of Iran. They would seek alternative ways of fighting against politics promoted by the Shah of Iran after repression by the imperial army and the SAVAK (the intelligence agency of the monarchy) in those days post to the coup against Mohammed Mossadeq in 1953. Students, professors, architects, engineers, lawyers, accountants, poets, novelists, translators and men of religion topped the thickness of such groups, which mostly were funded by the national economic elite, the bazaar[3]. According to Ervand Abrahamian, the Iranian guerrillas in pre-revolutionary era could be classified into five major groups despite their large intra-organizational mobility:
Guerrilla organizations before Iran's 1979
revolution
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1) - Sazman-i-ha-yi Cherik Feda'-I-I
Khalq Organization of Iran or freedom
fighters in Iran, better known as the Fedayi. The Fedayi, founded by Bezhan Hazani,
adopted his name as such in 1971,
and placed as a reactionary Marxist group but away from the Soviet Union. This
group advocated armed struggle led by intellectuals more than the peasant
class in Iran.
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2) - Sazman-i Mujahidin-i Khalq-I
Iran or Organization of Freedom Fighters of the Iranian People, better known
as the Mujahidin. Religious-radical block where Dr. Ali
Shariati indirectly gave ideological support to the movement-based on explanations
and analogies relating Shiite martyrdom applied to the revolution. Inspired by studies of Franz Fanon and
Antonio Gramci. The ideology of the movement
used to left out elements like atheism in Marxism but taking at the
same time those of the class struggle and anti-imperialism.
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3 - The Marxist wing of Sazman-i
Mujahidin-i Khalq-I Iran. From
1975 to 1979 this organization was known as the Marxist Mujahidin and after
the revolution in 1979 they adopted the name of Sazman Paykan to
rah-i-i-Azad-Tabaqeh-i Kargar or Organization Road Fighter for the Liberation
of the Working Class. It
was known simply as Paykan or Peky. Unlike the Mujahedeen, the organization
is more inclined Marxist postulates that the Quranic principles.
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4 - Small groups generally limited to
a region or town with different political leanings. Between them it was The
group of Abu Zahr, The True Shia group, Vaasan Group, Allah Akbar Group, The
group of Al Fajar, and others.
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5 - Marxist independent groups like
the Organization for the Liberation of the Iranian people Lurestan Group, The
Organization of the Ideals of the People, The Freedom Fighters of the Working
Class, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran The Revolutionary Organization of the
Tudeh Party, the Communist Party USA, among others. Radical secular block most of whom were
sponsored by some students, trade unions and workers belonging mainly to the
oil sector and some modern factories located in the city of Tehran. In the fall of the Shah, they would ask
that a "Islamic government ensure its security and existence, demanding
democracy, equality and government workers." Within some groups also were active
members of the National Liberation Front decadent, who clamored for a new
constitution and trying to form a group of secular reformers.
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Based on data from Abrahamian, Ervand., "The Guerrilla Movement in Iran 1963-1977", Merip Reports (86) 1980, pp. 15. Available in http://www.jstor.org/stable/3012295 accessed March 3, 2011. Abrahamian., Ervand., "Iran in Revolution: The Opposition Forces", in Merip Reports (75/76), 1979, pp.8.Available in http://www.jstror.org/stable/3012310 accessed March 3, 2011.
From these organizations, MKO reached a high degree of political activism combined
with several successes against the military power of imperial Iran. Among its objectives were several attacks against government buildings, robbing banks, killing important
officials and kidnappings of foreigners. Its methods, very similar to those used by
other armed Marxist organizations, were based on asymmetric attacks by cells
formed by few people who were known each other by pseudonyms, nicknames and
passwords in order to maintain loyalty within the group and avoid leaks or
espionage, strategies used by SAVAK to dismantle these organizations[4].
The
MKO military operations were supported by a Shiite Islamic speech which adapted
the philosophy of some Marxist revolutionary thinkers such as Che Guevara and
Mao Tse Tung (besides the nationalist influence of Franz Fanon) with the clear
goal of "creating, based in
the deepest religious traditions of the Iranian people, a revolutionary
movement to eliminate social injustice and moral pollution of imperialism,
thereby achieving relative class society (nizam al-Tawhid)”[5].
However, some contemporary scholars have questioned this theory by stating that
the use of the Quran and other important texts of Shiite Islam could have
served as a mere tool to mobilize the Iranian people, that’s because they think
that Marxism would have been unable to do it by itself, this could explain the
success that had MKO on others “non religious” Marxist organizations[6]. However, it is also important to note that
the MKO never called itself as a strictly Marxist organization (although its
principles contained large influence of this ideology) and other secular
Marxist organizations such as the Fedayeen e Khalq, also had a considerable number of fans despite not
make use of religious discourse[7].
However, Islam
was certainly an important element among Iranian society
in pre-revolutionary era. Most
members of the organizations at that time belonged to a generation that grew up
under the traditions and customs of Twelver Shi'ism which had been practiced
and inculcated by parents and teachers at home as well as school. Therefore, it was understandable that,
according to the international context against imperialism and the dictatorships
of this period of history, Islam was incorporated as an element of identity and
ideological inspiration in the struggle for justice and social equity, at least in the Islamic world. It is worth saying that is just at this
time when Islam has its “boom” in the Middle East given the evident failure of
Arabism, the strong opposition to the State of Israel and the corruption of
other models in the region, events that accelerated the incorporation of the Islamism as a
protest and political movement in this part of the world.
So then, the experiment of bringing
together the two most powerful anti-imperialist oppression of the moment,
Marxism and Islam, gave different results from other interpretations of Islam
in those days. To
cite one example, the MKO created its own interpretation of the Quran and its
own version of the Kitab al Balagha (Peak of eloquence), which, according to
some scholars, it was a modus operandi more like a cult than a guerrilla
or political movement[8]. Among its main ideological principles were
statements such as the fact that every Muslim was a guerrilla man and not just
a believer, that it was necessary to teach religious men how to convert Islam
religion in a revolutionary force and others like the fact that the true
spiritual purification of man must be
and just must be achieved through revolution and the realization of a just
society[9]. In 1975 an internal fissure because of
such interpretations affected the MKO and formed an alternative group,
"the Marxist Muyahedeen, better known as Pekyar, which leaned more to the
Marxist postulates than Quran ones while intensifying its armed struggle against the monarchy.
One
way to offset this internal crack was the approach of MKO with Khomeini. Ayatollah
Rafsanjani served as intermediary between them becoming one of the greater moments
of understanding among men of religion and traditional Islamic-Marxists:
During this period, meetings of the
MKO included in its propaganda pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini along with those
of Taleqani and in public events they were seen as "the left of the
revolution." However,
this pact could be considered more like a pragmatic action than a sign of
ideological balance because during this time MKO had enriched its political
speech with the ideas of Ali Shariati, one of the most respected thinkers of
the contemporary Iranian history who despite not having also considered as a
mujahedeen, was seen as one of the great architects of the revolution:
"Shia Islam was not conservative or apolitical fatalism but rather is a revolutionary
ideology that should permeate all spheres of life and inspire true believers to
fight against all forms of oppression, exploitation and social injustice”[11].
This ideology would be applied later to criticize the social reorganization of
the government of the Islamic Republic.
In addition, Khomeini supporters
also enjoyed the backing of many people in the provinces and large cities where
people look to religion as the only salvation way to the oppression of the
monarchy. Thus,
the revolution could not have been possible only through armed struggle of the
"intellectual elite" but it was also necessary to complement each
other with “the masses” in order to obtain a coalition of forces strong enough
to make a real and possible change. With this eminent alliance, Reza Pahlavi
attempted to show signs of reconciliation by releasing some political prisoners
(including Massoud Rajavi, who would be the leader of MKO after the revolution)
as well as some calls for peacekeeping. However, this would not be possible because
the revolutionary movement was already well formed and, on the contrary, the
released prisoners would join to their organizations of origin. So, the
pressure against the monarchy would increase and its fall would be unavoidable. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was forced to abdicate
by fleeing the country while Khomeini arrived from exile in France and marked
the symbol of the triumph of the Islamic revolution.
The times after this revolutionary
process were the most difficult for the guerrillas, especially those who had a
different view, politically and ideologically, of the Islamic interpretation of
the newly established Islamic Republic. The eighties was a challenge for all
movements that once took part in demonstrations against the monarchy since they
did not find the political space that they wanted in the new system. The
struggle methods, ideology and the power sharing inside the new
government were not acceptable. Even
during the war with Iraq, there were many "purges" which served to
"identify the conspirators in order to care for the revolution" and to
prevent internal collapse, which would have been catastrophic for the
government of Khomeini who, on the other side, tried to unite all Iranians
against the external threat, this was Iraq.
Ideologically, the conflict with the
MKO focused on the concept of "Islamic state" where Velayat al
Faqih Khomeini´s system was not compatible with the Nizam al Tawhid,
project promoted by the group during its pre-revolutionary campaign, causing MKO
to take up arms against Khomeini himself and carried out several attacks
against the new government officials and even, unfortunately, innocent people
on the streets of Tehran and other important cities of the country. This was the beginning of a
new war between Islamic Republic and MKO, war which led the new government to
persecute and imprison them (as well as activists from other organizations such
as the Tudeh party and Fedayeen), through the newly formed force for
revolution, the Revolutionary Guards[12]. MKO, which was led by Massoud Rajavi in
that period, had become in the enemy of revolution in a few years, feeling
betrayed as the
rest of the guerrillas.
Iraq:
from enemies of the revolution to terrorist organization
During the eighties, MKO increased its number of followers. Some authors attest to an estimated half a million supporters just in Tehran, estimate made by the witness of one of the biggest demonstrations in its history within the country in 1981[13]. The strength of the movement at that time led to its leaders to think about an internal restructuring and so, in the same year, they could create the National Council of Resistance (NCRI), an attempt to bring together in one organization to a conglomerate of groups that, as in the revolution, have felt the same objective but now against Khomeini. And although created in Tehran with a majority of the MKO within it, this organization had the support of groups and personalities of the stature of Bani Sadr and members of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, who would carry out their main activities from Paris under the chairmanship of Maryam Rajavi[14], who began to promote a political agenda with different objectives such as freedom of speech, press without censorship, the abolition of the courts established by Khomeini, the guarantee of women's rights, the abolition of differences of belief and gender and the pursuit of a free market economy[15].
NCRI began with a social base mostly
of women which responded to the same disagreement with the government of Khomeini. The NCRI picked up its view on the gender
issue from MKO´s ideology, where women are seen on an equal footing with men,
without physical and social differences, and with a special role in the
organization of a “just society”. For this reason, mujahedin women would
take an active role in the organization since the revolutionary period up to
now due to its "free right to participate in the revolution and the quest
for social dignity"[16].
Mujahedin women were a strategic element to contact jailed members through
conjugal visits, in addition to working on issues ranging from nursing,
organizing demonstrations and propaganda and even conducting military
operations, this can be test with the record of victims of some lists published
by the organization in the mid-eighties which contains a considerable
percentage of women[17]. However, when Massoud Rajavi got married
with Maryam Azondalu (to take following the surname of her husband, Rajavi) a
plethora of criticism exploded within the organization because Massoud was not
yet divorced from his second wife (the daughter of Bani Sadr who had a younger age in that time) and who
had no opportunity to decide about her marriage with Massoud. There were also other
“forced marriages” within the group as time passed, which did not seem a good
basis for someone who wanted to defend women's rights[18].
But
1986 was crucial to study the relations between MKO and the Islamic Republic. The untenable situation took to Massoud
Rajavi to agree an alliance with Saddam Hussein's government in order to
promote his cause. Massoud
Rajavi established relationships with Saddam Hussein since 1983 through his
contacts with the Kurdish Iran Party (an NCRI member) who by then had a good
relationship with the Iraqi government[19].
However, this tactic would have counterproductive effects in the internal
social base of MKO where public opinion not fully understood this decision (since
the Iraq conflict had impregnated nationalistic feelings and internal cohesion
to most Iranians). Some
scholars believe that the agreement with Iraq was geopolitically necessary but socially inappropriate:
"I
think that, just because MKO forces were located in Iraq, the movement lost
legitimacy. MKO
settled in Iraq because there was nowhere else to go….besides the proximity to
Iran was important. It
was a reflection according to the geographical and political realities”[20]
Taking advantage of this, the
Islamic government launched a media campaign (which persists up to now) against
MKO, where its leaders are accused as "traitors,"
"hypocrites," "radical" and "infidels" due to
negotiate with the enemy, making its social base within the country weaker and forcing them to live in hiding. The evidence was clear, Massoud Rajavi was
raised to change the strategy of armed resistance from Iran to Iraq,
particularly from the Camp Ashraf, situated in the north of the arab country, a
place that had been donated by Saddam Hussein not only to be used as a
residence for the majority of group members (most of whom had left Iran) but
also for military activities and training to serve Saddam Hussein in espionage issues,
administrative duties as translations
and even personal assistance through the National Liberation Army (NLA).
The
NLA was established in 1987 and would serve as the official arm of the NCRI. According to some sources, this army would
help to establish a private security force for Saddam Hussein while participate
in various acts of repression against Kurds living in Iraq[21]. The creation of the NLA was part of what
Massoud Rajavi called the "internal revolution", which, by means of a
conference of more than five days in Ashraf, the new guidelines for membership were
dictated. In this period, some strange practices were adopted in the group such
as celibacy, the reduction of sleep and the emphasis on the unquestionable
leadership of Massoud Rajavi. At
this time, his wife, Maryam Rajavi, became the “earthly” leader in NCRI while Massoud
Rajavi fall in a sort of "divine power", taking powerful control not
only of MKO but also the NCRI[22].
At that time, it is estimated that
the MKO had a network of between 30 000 and 50 000 active in the NLA, the group
responsible for a series of attacks against the Islamic government both inside
and outside Iran, the latter through attacks against its embassies and
diplomatic personnel. The
most striking event of these operations is known by the simultaneous attack
over eleven embassies in 1992 in retaliation for the alleged bombing of its
facilities in Ashraf by the Iranian Air Force. In this attack, the Iranian embassy in
Canberra was the most damaged because not only official Iranian diplomats were
killed but also Australian ones[23].
Attacks along the nineties brought
the U.S. and Europe to declare the group a terrorist organization[24]. Moreover, persecution by the intelligence
apparatus of the Islamic Republic has intensified given the brutality and
effectiveness of MKO terrorist attacks[25].
An example of such events was the alleged murder of Kazem Rajavi in Geneva in
1990 and other officers of the NCRI in Europe between 1993 and 1996 by the
Ministry of Intelligence and Security of Iran (MOIS)[26]. These attacks followed throughout the
decade, representing almost a situation of war between the two sides, since MKO
had sophisticated weapons among which I mention heavy artillery, planes, rocket launchers, tanks, mines,
missiles, Katyusha and some infantry weapons[27].
. MKO
were also responsible for several criminal acts including murder of Asadollah
Lejevardi (then director of the Iranian prison system), Ali Sayyad Shirazi, (a
senior representative of the armed forces) and even the unsuccessful attempt to
assassinate the Iranian President Mohammed Khatami by an attack at his home in Teheran in 2000[28]. For its part, the Revolutionary Guard
responded to these attacks by heavy bombing in its facilities by launching
surface-surface Scud-B missiles, (one of the strongest occurred on April 18,
2001 where the Islamic Republic sent
about 44 missiles at the camps of the MKO)[29],
which MKO used immediately for accusing Iran of violating Iraqi
sovereignty noting the lack of respect for 598 resolution of UN Security Council
which gave
final approval of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988[30].
The geopolitics of human rights: from terrorist to freedom fighters?
However,
the status of Saddam Hussein would change and MKO position would suffer a misfortune. The linkage of 9/11 events and the alleged
stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction by the Iraqi regime would trigger an
instability in the entire Arab country that would involve the actions of several
groups, included the MKO. This was an extremely difficult time in geopolitical
terms for the group because the ally that had allowed it to operate for more
than two decades was at risk of falling. Thus, the NCRI made an attempt to shield
itself against international situation leading to the MKO to give a media coup
that triggered another crisis in the midst of the Iraq ones, this was, the
filter of information on the Iranian nuclear program in 2002 (although it was
not until February 2005 that the group would officially disclose to the
International Atomic Energy Agency) saying that the Islamic Republic was in
possession of the necessary components to build a nuclear bomb which, according to its information, could
have been achieved by the end of that year[31]. The purpose of this leak was win U.S.
support by offering to provide information on the Iranian issue while its time
in Iraq was increasingly standing out.
Anyway, MKO face bad times during
operation "Enduring Freedom" in which the U.S. bombed some of the
bases of the NLA, forcing them to disarm and declare themselves a ceasefire in
April 2003. These
events coincided with the arrest of Maryam Rajavi in Paris and another 165
leaders of the NCRI in June of that year on charges of terrorism in Europe[32]. Later, with serious manifestations of
supporters who set fire themselves to demand the release of their leader,
Rajavi and his colleagues would be released but not before confiscating nearly
$ 8 million and some other private properties. Thus, paradoxically, this situation seemed
to be playing against all regional enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran
(recap, the MKO, Saddam Hussein and even the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and
now in Pakistan), which led to Iranian
leaders to engage in an "active neutrality" because, in some academic
circles, the invasion of Iraq was rejected because it could have represented
the beginning of a series invasions of other states opposed to the U.S ideology
in the region, including Iran and Syria, besides that, for other Iranian experts, a
weak Saddam Hussein was preferable to a “American Iraq”, capable of rendering a
future alliance with Israel against Iran[33]. However, this did not happen, and history
has shown very different things to see that today there is a huge Iranian
influence in the reconstruction of Iraq and the elimination of Saddam Hussein regime
has been a valuable opportunity for Iran in order to establish itself as a regional power in
the Middle East.
Despite this, the ceasefire did not
mean the MKO performance, and much less its disappearance because, it would
take at least a year to define its legal status. According to a report of an
institute specialized intelligence, there was considerable confusion with
regard to the MKO in the U.S. because, officially, it was a group listed as a
terrorist organization with which, however, U.S. forces had entered into a ceasefire as a "hostile force”[34]. It was so until 2004, when the Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld would determine the legal status of the organization
by classifying it as "protected persons" (rather than prisoners of
war) under the terms of the 4th. Geneva Convention on the Rights of War[35].
The U.S. double standards allowed
the MKO (and especially the NCRI) to continue its efforts to create and nurture
a lobby not only in Europe but also in the U.S. A great triumph of the NCRI was the fact
that the U.S. placed on its list of terrorist organizations the Revolutionary
Guard in October 2007, being a singular event that a national army be contained
therein[36]. But, coupled with this episode, the more biggest
diplomatic success of the organization from its exile in Iraq has been its
removal from the official list of terrorist organizations of the EU in January
2009[37],
an event that allowed it to collect a new identity and image within Europe, a region where most fans
would report from this event up to now by initiating a full political marketing
directed toward the defense of human rights, democracy and the pursuit of an
"Iran with a secular government." Once again, a radical change, now in its
ideology, was to encourage the survival of MKO where Mariam Rajavi would commit
the organization to continue its fight against the Islamic Republic under a
different framework, namely, making the MKO a group of pro-democracy secular court
(and not a court armed Islamic-Marxist anymore) that would opt for non-violent
methods.
After such triumphs, MKO continued its
efforts to create an important lobby in Europe and the U.S. through NCRI (although
in the latter country was still considered a terrorist organization)[38]. Among the main groups are able to
consolidate the Iran Policy Committee based in Washington and the Friends of a
Free Iran, the latter within the European Parliament with MEPs from Belgium,
Spain and Holland. Among its new methods used today it includes the use of the
Internet as the main medium of communication, printed propaganda, discussion
forums and seminars as well as radio and television programs on private
channels[39].
However, the situation within the
NCRI is not entirely clear, especially with regard to the status of Ashraf
residents, estimated at 3 500 according to the latest recorded census, because
there has been information collected from the own residents where they accuse MKO
leaders to deprive them of freedoms and even to lead them to brutal punishments
such as imprisonment and deprivation of food thoroughly “if you do not obey the
orders of their superior elements”[40].
"Ashraf is not a field, has a university, a convention center, a park, among other things. It looks more like a mini-state under orders totally absurd and a cult led to Massoud Rajavi, a field that strictly”[41]
Ashraf's situation is complicated because the implementation of the 4 th.Geneva Convention require the U.S. role as an occupying power in Iraq, role that, from January 1, 2009, do not exist anymore due to the control of the territory has passed into the hands of the new Iraqi government. So, a thing has changed dramatically. The new government of Nour al Maliki, has only two options for the residents: to be repatriated to Iran (which would mean a series of arrests by Islamic government or perhaps a series of amnesties or acquittals for innocent people), or to find a third country for resettlement. The point is clear: Iraq does not want the MKO in Ashraf and the push for its exile is growing every day. Proof of this has been the series of protests and clashes between Iraqi military personnel and residents of the area in which there have been several serious incidents, injuries and casualties on both sides[42].
This has also led to recent
allegations of abuse by the new Iraqi army against the residents, a phenomenon
which, together with the abuses of the MKO leaders themselves, have returned to
Ashraf in a little hell for the inhabitants that, according to several
witnesses, claim to have tried to leave the Campo more than one occasion to
seek asylum or work in other countries but without luck due to the arrest by
the Iraqi army as well as NLA leaders[43].
.
Final comments
Final comments
MKO have survived because of the alliances that have been promoted throughout its history. At first, Marxism gave the possibility of bringing a considerable number of intellectuals against the Shah as well as they used Islam to be closer to Khomeini. Today, they have adopted human rights discourse for approaching the U.S. and Europe following the same strategy of many years ago, that is, to find a powerful ally to help them seize power in Iran.
The efforts of MKO currently rely on
two things: to discredit the Islamic Republic by the lack of freedom among its
people and the mistakes made in its domestic and foreign policy, and to achieve,
as it did with the EU two years ago, that U.S. remove them from its official
terrorist organizations list to gain more legal legitimacy in their actions,
which would help to erase the historical memory of the series of actions that
have tarnished the organization who have questioned the veracity of your project as a
political alternative in Iran.
MKO do not enjoy popularity inside
Iran. Its
heyday has passed and the support they had in revolutionary times has almost
completely disappeared due to, on the one hand, the resentment that caused its
alliance with Saddam Hussein in the mid-eighties and, by the other, its
position against nuclear program (while the program is seen as a legitimate
right by most of the Iranian population). If today's MKO get the support that they
are looking for from U.S. history could repeat itself, that´s because the
Iranian government has tried to convince his people that “the ills of the
nation” come from largely externally policies by the Great Powers, mainly the U.S., so,
in this way, MKO and NCRI would be related with the threat of war propaganda
made it by Israel, the espionage cases in Iran, cyber attacks on its nuclear
facilities and of course the economic sanctions. This will not be well seen by the Iranian population, especially in
young people, sector that has turned more to see movements like Mousavi
(so-called green movement) or the old Movement for Freedom Iran, as more
serious opposition movements than the promulgated by the enigmatic group of
Rajavi.
The figure of Massoud Rajavi has
fallen into an "occult and even messianic image" within the MKO,
which also raises questions of democracy within the organization itself because
his figure has remained the
top of the organization for over thirty years without any sign of political
pluralism.
Finally, there are still some things
to look forward to elucidate the organization's future black. The U.S. refusal
to remove them from its blacklist of terrorist organizations is one of them as
well as the current situation of the residents of Ashraf, issues that need more
detailed discussion in a separate work, an effort that goes beyond the
objective of this paper.
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arrest of Maryam Rajavi in France and the Court Case Against her," MKO
Watch, 2009.
• Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization., Mokhtasar Sharh-e Zendegi-e Shahid AZ
Inghelabi Sazeman Panj-e Mojahedin-e Khalq (A brief life history of five
martyrs of the Organization of the Mujahedeen e Khalq), Tehran, Mojahedin-e Khalq Publications, 1974.
• Rajavi, Maryam., Maryam Rajavi: her life, her Thoughts. CNRI, no place of publication, 1995.
• Riaz Hassan., "Iran's Islamic Revolutionaries: Before and after
the Revolution", The Third World Quarterly, (6) 3, 1984.
• Shoaee, Rokhsare., "The Mujahid Women of Iran: Reconciling
culture and gender", Middle East Journal, 41 (4): 1987.
• Singleton, A., Saddam's Private Army. Changed How Rajavi Iran's Mojahedin from
Armed Revolutionaries to an Armed Cult, UK, Drukkerik, 2003.
• Squassoni, Sharon, Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments,
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, RS21592, 2003.
• Stock, Margaret., Providing Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist
Organization: The Pentagon, the Department of State, The People's Mujahedin of
Iran & The Global War on Terrorism, Bender's Immigration Bulletin, 2006.
• Taremi, Kamran., "Iranian Foreign Policy Towards Occupied Iraq
2003-2005", Middle East Policy, (12) 4: 2005.
• Tarzi, Amin. "Missile Messages: Iran Strikes MKO Bases in
Iraq", The Non Proliferation Review, 2001.
U.S.department of Treasury, Terrorism: What Your Need to Know About U.S
Sanctions, U.S, Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Washington, 2009.
• Vakili, Abdollah., "In Search of Revolutionary Islam. The case of Taleqani and the Mojahedin
", The Muslim World, (88), 1998.
[1] Mahmud Taleqani was a man of religion with a very high reputation and
legitimacy in Iran during the seventies. Some analysts have questioned the success of the 1979
revolution without his cooperation since enjoyed the support of several
political fronts, from the nationalist, religious and some Marxist guerrillas
including the Mujeheden to secular Marxists as Fedayeen. Much of the "social
harmonization” that faced the Shah of Iran's revolution was through the work
and speeches of Taleqani who months after breaking ground continued to
influence the consolidation of the new Islamic government after a public appeal
to the people of Iran
to ratify the twelve-point declaration which established the leadership of
Khomeini. Later, Taleqani expressed concern
about a government of one man in Iran with his position against efforts to
create a consultative council popular. Born in 1910 and died in September
1979 and today is remembered as a pillar of the revolution and as a man who
used to say that the true Islamic government would be one that will work for
people and their social enforcement. See further in Vakili, Abdollah.,
"In Search of Revolutionary Islam. The case of Taleqani and the Mojahedin", The Muslim
World, (88), 1998, pp. 22.
[2]MKO was formed between 1964 and 1965 by many members between them Saeed Mohsen, Ali Asghar,
Mohammed Badi Zadegan and Hanafi Nezhad. They studied the forms of protest around the world and classify MKO between
the so called block of “intellectual and social criticism” which played an important
role as Islam itself in political scenarios.
[3] Ashraf, Ahmad
& Abrahamian, Ervand., “Bazaar and Mosque in Iran´s Revolution”, MERIP Reports, (113), 1983, pág. 16,
available at
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0047265%28198303%2F04%290%3A113%3C16%3AAABAMI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-, accessed
March 8, 2011.
[4] Miyata, Osumi., “The Tudeh
military network during the oil nationalization period”, Middle Eastern
Studies, (23) 3; 1987, pp. 313-328.
[5] Jungyun, Gill & De Fronzo,
James., “A Comparative Framework for the Analysis of International Student
Movements”, Social Movements Studies, (8) 3: 2009, p. 18.
[6] Javadzadeh, Abdolrahim., Marxists
into Muslims: An Iranian Irony, FIU Electronic Theses and dissertations.
Paper 36. 2007, Pp. 252. Available at http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/36 accessed March, 2 2011.
[7] Keddie, Nikkie., “Iranian
Revolutions in Comparative Perspective”, The American Historical Review,
(88)3: 1983, pp. 579-598. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1864588,
accessed January, 8, 2011.
[8] Dorraj, Manochehr., “The
Political Sociology of Sects and Sectarianism in Iranian Politics: 1960-1979”, Journal
of Third World Studies, (23)2, 2006, pp. 95-117.
[9] Mojahedin-e
Khalq Organization., Sharh Mokhtasar-e Zendegi-e Inghelabi Panj Shahid AZ
Sazeman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq, Teheran, Mojahedin-e Khalq Publications,
1974, pp. 13-14.
[10]
Ali Akbar, Hashemi-Rafsanjani., Engelab ya besat-e jadid (Revolución o
nueva misión), Qom, Yafar Publishers, 1985
[11] Ali Shariati was born in 1933 in a village north of the province of Khorasan. He studied Arabic
in Mashad and then earn his PhD in France where he received the influence of
people like Franz Fanon, Louis Massignon and Raymond Aaron. He was an excellent speaker who
extolled Marxism as critical both traditional Islam and intellectual movement.
Having been in prison and criticized by traditional Islam, the Shah's regime expelled him to England where he died suspiciously. Although Shariati did not live to see the revolution, no doubt contributed to it by his ideas against the usurpation of power.
See more in Bayat, Assef., “Shari´ati
and Marx: A critique of an “Islamic” Critique of Marxism”, Alif; Journal of
Comparative Poetics, (10), 1990, pp. 19-41. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/521715,
accessed February 5, 2011.
[12] Riaz,
Hassan., “Iran's Islamic Revolutionaries: Before and after the Revolution”, The
Third World Quarterly, (6) 3, 1984, PP. 675-686. Available
at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992069,
accessed February 7, 2011.
[13] Singleton, A., Saddam´s Private
Army. How Rajavi Changed Iran´s Mojahedin from Armed Revolutionaries to an
Armed Cult, UK, Drukkerik, 2003, pp. 210.
[14] Rajavi, Maryam., Maryam Rajavi:
her life, her thoughts. NCRI, Paris, 1995, pp. 24.
[15]
Cafarellla, Nicole., Mujahidee-e Khalq (MEK) Dossier, Center for
Policing Terrorism, Washingotn, 2005, p. 5.
[16] Massoud Rajavi., “Message on the
occasion of the International Women's Day”, Iran Liberation, (160),
1985, p. 2.
[17] Shoaee, Rokhsare., “The Mujahid
Women of iran: reconciling culture and gender”, Middle East
Journal, 41(4): 1987, pp. 519-537. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/4327637
accessed February 14, 2011.
[18] Singleton, A., Op. Cit. pp.
147.
[19]
Idem. Pp. 111.
[20] Senator Robert Torricelli.
Statement made at a press conference on Capitol Hill on 8 June 1995. Cited in
Brie, André at al., People´s Mojahedin of Iran. Mission Report. Friends
of a Free Iran of European Parlament, Bruselas, 2005, pág. 23.
[21] Singleton, A., Op. Cit, pp.1-24.
[22]
Idem. P. 150.
[23] Information, Analysis and Advice
for the Parliament. “Research Note: Behind the Mujahidee-e Khalq (MeK)”, Department
of the Parliamentary Library, (43), 2003. pp 1-2.
[24] The U.S government did it in 1997
and European Union in 2002.
[25] Davari, Abbas., About MOIS
Publication “Saddam´s Private Army” And
a Glance at Emma Nicholson´s activities against Iranian Resistance,
Amirkhiz Publications, Ashraf, 2005, pág. 13.
[26] Iran: State of
Terror – An Account of terrorist assassinations by Iranian agents’, pp. 17 to
22. Cited in Brie, Op. Cit. pág.
Pág. 30.
[27] Goulka., J., et al., Mujahedeen
e Khalq in Iraq: a policy of Conundrum, RAND, Santa mónica, 2009. Pág. 9.
[28]
Cafarella. Op. Cit. P. 5.
[29] Tarzi, Amin., “ Missile Messages:
Iran Strikes MKO Bases in Iraq”, The Non Proliferation Review, 2001, p.
127.
[30] S/RES/598, available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/525/09/IMG/NR052509.pdf?OpenElement, accessed March 4, 2011.
[31] Squassoni,
Sharon, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent
Developments, Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Research Service, RS21592, August 15, 2003. Pp 1-2.
[32]
MKO Watch. “The arrest of Maryam Rajavi in France and the Court case
against her”, MKO Watch, available
at www.mekwatch.org accessed December 27,
2010.
[33] Taremi, Kamran., “Iranian Foreign
Policy Towards Occupied Iraq 2003-2005”, Middle East Policy, (12) 4:
2005, pp. 28-47
[34] Goulka., J., Op. Cit. p. 7.
[35] The 4th Geneva Convention, in its Article 4, deals with the protection of civilians in times of war and under occupation by an occupying power.
The same article
defines as protected persons "any civilian who is under
the stewardship of the occupier and who are not nationals of the occupied country”. In this
case, the MKO
residents in Ashraf are Iranian nationals who are in that situation and who have applied this legislation because Iran, the country
to which he belongs, is a signatory to the convention. Additionally, Article 3 of the same document states that protected persons must be treated humanely and not be subject to act of coercion,
punishment or retaliation.
[36] US Department of Treasury, Terrorism:
What you Need to Know about U.S Sanctions, US Department of Treasury Office
of Foreign Assets Control, Washington, 2009, p, 12, available at http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/terror/terror.pdf,
accessed February 9, 2011.
[37] Mark, John, “EU takes Iran
opposition group off terrorist list”, Reuters, January 26 2009,
available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/asiaCrisis/idUKLQ200287, accessed February 30, 2011.
[38] See the last reply to MKO by the
U.S. Condoleezza Rice number 6480 in Federal Register, 74(7), January 12, 2009.
[39] Chen, Hsinchun., et al.,
“Unconvering the Dark Web: A case study of Jihad on the Web”; Journal of the
American Society for Information Science and technology, 59(8): 2008, pp. 1347-1359.
[40] Human Rights Watch, No Exit: Human Rights Abuses Inside the MKO Camps
(May 2005). Available at available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iran0505/iran0505.pdf,
accessed February 16, 2011. You can also see Human Rights Watch, Statement
on Responses to Human Rights Watch Report on Abuses by the Mojahedin-e Khalq
Organization (MKO), available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/02/15/iran12678_txt.htm
, accessed February 16, 2011.
[41] Stock, Margaret., Providing
Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization: The Pentagon, the
Department of State, The People´s Mujahedin of Iran & The Global War on
Terrorism, Bender´s Immigration Bulletin, 2006, p. 17.
[42] BBC News Online, “Iraq releases
Iranian dissidents”, BBC Online, October 7, 2009, available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8295323.stm, accessed March 10, 2011.
[43] Like Ahmad
Jaafari´s case who last January 10 2011, escaped from Ashraf Camp where has
been detained over 21 years. See on Sahar Family Foundation, “Ahmad Jafari
could escape Camp Ashraf”, available at
http://www.nejatngo.org/en/post.aspx?id=3466, accessed March 10, 2011.
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